All desires that do not lead to pain when they remain unsatisfied are unnecessary, but the desire is easily got rid of, when the thing desired is difficult to obtain or the desires seem likely to produce harm.
Epicurus, Principal Doctrines
Sex and the (global) city
The wedding of Prince William to Kate Middleton was the most mediated and viewed event in human history. Eclipsing the marriage of William's own parents in 1981, the 2011 British royal wedding was telecast, podcast, tweeted, reported and skype-cast to an estimated 2 billion people across the planet (BBC, 2011a) . While other great global spectacles have attracted enormous viewing audiences, the royal wedding appears to have elicited a universal romantic and nuptial imagining. Diverse viewing communities across the world were, presumably, entranced by the grandeur and glamour of the event, and a sense of shared ritual that sanctified desire, fecundity and the promise of new life and new hope. In this context, the splendour, pageant and nuptial symbology of the wedding subsumed many alternative readings, including the horrors that attach to British sovereign and imperial history. Australian Aboriginal activist and academic Marcia Langton, for example, explains her own and her community's support for the wedding in terms of a parallel devotion to ritual and deep tradition (Langton, 2011) . Similarly, Balinese scholar I Nyoman Darma Putra parenthesized the cultural politics of caste, class and European colonialism in his appreciation of the event. For Darma Putra the royal wedding conjured much of the splendour of 1 his own cultural traditions, particularly through regency and pageant: 'The people, who can never afford such opulence, are invited into the lives and magnificent spectacle of the royal family ' (Putra, 2011) .
While much of the media commentary invoked the 'fairy-tale princess' mythology that is frequently deployed for such occasions (Phillips, 1999; Berkowitz, 2000) , the regal marriage also represented a particular permutation of celebrity culture within the more generalized global economy of pleasure (Lewis, 2008; Sternheimer, 2011; Stanyer, 2012) . At one level, the royal wedding might be seen as a (quasi-) religious congregation, a celebrity re-rendering of community worship and libation (Frow, 1998; Rojek, 2001 Rojek, , 2009 Turner, 2004) . Karen Sternheimer (2011) has taken up this idea, arguing that celebrity takes a secular experience, such as media entertainment, and enhances it through various forms of fantasy and the intensification of individuals and their performances. John Frow (1998) has argued that celebrity enshrines individuals with a sense of transcendence that creates 'aura'.
In this vein, The Washington Post (2011) hosted a forum on the apparent disjunction between the religious and ritual experience of the royal wedding and its context within secularist societies like the United Kingdom. The discussion highlighted this apparent paradox, suggesting that the wedding appealed to global audiences because of an immanent and natural human disposition for worship, spirituality and ritual. The majority of posts to the discussion board claimed that sacred rituals and sites are 'universal', reaching to all people in all cultures and circumstances ( Washington Post , 2011) .
Celebrity in this sense represents a meticulously woven conflux of secular erotica and spiritual symbology. Indeed, while some may consider the royals another example of people who are 'famous for being famous ' (Boorstin, 1961) , or at least famous for being born into fame, the symbolism of regency has its own particular claims on the popular imaginary. The cultural status of royalty is shaped around invocations of the deep traditions of sovereignty and statehood, as well as claims to a divine and genetically superior familial lineage. This cast of superiority is inscribed in the discourse of social order, status and stability; it is precisely this lineage and sense of stability which feeds a government's right to govern -its privilege and power. As we noted in the previous chapter, this social ordering is not simply an exercise of distant management, but is infused through the discourses, knowledge systems and relational networks that sustain a given social formation.
The aura that is implicated in celebrity religiosity thus becomes more explicit in a regal lineage that continually reminds media audiences of its unique social relevance and presence within the diffuse channels of governmentality and the social imaginary. While movie stars, popular musicians and sports people may perform a social role outside their given zone of stardom, the royals are bound by history and duty to a form of omnipresence that exceeds the limits of their own corporeality or mortality. The royals, that is, are immortalized in the symbology of the state and governmentality, and their deep social incursions into the ordering and security of everyday social life. Thus, while other stars may fade in and out of fashion, the royals are maintained within the durability of statehood and the meticulous weave that sustains human order and social meaning-making. The royals, in a sense, are always there, because the state is always there (Redmond and Holmes, 2007) .
Thus, even while non-royal celebrities may engage in various forms of political expression, and politicians may seek to enhance their public persona as celebrities, the royals are always and inevitably political. The royals' historical and social primacy is subtly inscribed on the cultural web through the pervasiveness of state symbology, the processes of governmentality, and the social framing of hierarchy and privilege through normative and ineluctable organizational principles.
While we may have Lady Gaga vocalizing the liberation of transgender individuals, Sean Penn opposing American intercessions in the Middle East, or Leonardo DiCaprio proselytizing on behalf of the environment, the royals of themselves represent the durability of the state and the right to govern. This politicism is even more absolute than the articulation of causes or political party positions, as the royals represent the intrinsic and ontological condition of their 'highness'. The British royal family, in particular, are more acutely political, as they represent the 'supra-political', a miraculous condition which is above the antagonistic claims of power-seekers: the royals actually represent 'power' per se , as they personify the divinely sanctioned state and its perpetuity as an unassailable and unitary entity.
Celebrity power and the mediasphere
I have argued elsewhere that the media are best understood as a set of interdependent relationships by which audiences, text-producers and texts interact with one another and their cultural context in order to produce meanings (Lewis, 2002 (Lewis, , 2005 (Lewis, , 2008 (Lewis, , 2011 . I have also argued that the media draw together the public and private dominions of community life, enabling the interconnection between individuals and various collective-social apparatuses. The notion of a 'mediasphere' extends this idea, acknowledging that the public and the private dimensions of a human life can never actually be disaggregated, but are entirely interdependent; the media are the primary means by which this interdependence is fostered and articulated. This mediasphere, therefore, is inevitably 'political', as Aristotle would define it, since it enables different discourses and knowledge systems to struggle against one another in pursuit of unity and pre-eminence. This is not the 'public sphere' exalted by Jürgen Habermas (1991) , but the convergence of rational, sensate and emotional claims of knowing that circulate through a given social formation.
To this end, celebrities, including and especially celebrities like Prince William and Kate Middleton, are principal figures in the cultural politics of the mediasphere. In this context, the polity is comprised of creative and active audiences who engage with their celebrity and narrative dominions through various forms of conjunctive and contending cultural imaginings (Hartley, 1999; Hartley and Green, 2005; McGuigan, 2005; Silverstone, 2007; Lewis, 2008) . Celebrity, in this sense, creates a nucleus for the production and social accretion of meaning, allowing individuals to assemble and organize their own conceptions and imaginings of the cultural politics by which they live their lives. Through the proliferation of images, narratives and symbols that are generated through the contemporary mediasphere and global economy of pleasure, that is, audiences create community and identity, even as these imaginings are perpetually challenged by contending knowings and knowledge systems (Lewis, 2002 (Lewis, , 2008 Turner, 2004; Rojek, 2009) .
The royals generally, and the royal wedding in particular, represent an ideal locus for this cultural congregation and symbolic management. Indeed, the very survival of the royals is contingent upon their own capacity to generate navigational maps of meaning: that is, their capacity to reinscribe themselves and their social value within contemporary cultural and economic conditions. In order to resist cultural and political redundancy, the British royal family, in particular, has had to amplify its role and cultural relevance through the media and the global celebrity industry. The aristocratic 'distinction', as Pierre Bourdieu (1984) might call it, has had to be re-cast within an economy of pleasure, justifying and branding itself through narrative imaginings and an aura that is constituted around sexuality, as much as divine privilege.
It was certainly this dramatic narrative that was generated around Princess Diana, her sexuality, charity, betrayal and tragic death. In an ideal tabloid rendering, Diana's life and death were imagined in terms of an eschatological doom for which the wedding of her first son became the beacon of the royal family's redemption. In this context, the wedding allowed the global citizenry to re-enliven their fantasies of secular and divine bliss against the tawdry dis-grace of Prince Charles and his mother, the Queen.
Kate and William restored the fantasy of a future that promises abundance and glory, the fantasy enshrined in the British royal-national anthem. To celebrate this glorious Britannia, many global audiences assembled their own private wedding parties with ceremonies and celebrational regalia. Organized often by women, these parties proliferated across the planet, as, indeed, did the sale of royal memorabilia, especially imitation royal wedding rings. The most popular of these royal imitations was based on the actual blue diamond ring which William had inherited from his deceased mother, Diana, and given to his bride. Coming out of a mass production factory in Yiwu in China, the imitation rings had sold over a million units by the time of the wedding (Doran, 2011) .
In many respects, therefore, the royal wedding brought together many of the primary components and motifs that drive the modern mediasphere and contemporary global economies. The imitation rings generated out of the rising industrial powerhouse of China represent the acme of the simulacra society, a society that is dominated by imitations and symbology, as Jean Baudrillard (1983, 1984a, 1984b ) has described it. The ring, itself a symbol of cyclical fecundity, marshals the power of the global pleasure economy through a spectacle that is loaded with diffuse and contending meanings that attract both semiotic and fiscal value. Indeed, the imitation rings acknowledge this accretion and the desire of ordinary people to empower themselves, their everyday lives and their personal rituals with meaning, purpose and value. Such value may not approximate the vast expense of the royal wedding and regalia like Princess Beatrice's costume, but it shares in the fecundity and force of the fantasy by which the wedding draws its social and cultural knowing.
To this end, the royal wedding links to the 'perpetuity rituals' that proliferate across human Holocene cultures. In a very real sense, these apocalypse nuptials conjoin the ritualized meaning of reproduction and its mobilization in the biopolitics of gender. The royal wedding fortified the imagining of female allure and male potency, particularly a male potency that is valorized through archetypical tropes of masculine danger, militarism and violence. Like many other Holocene nuptial rituals, masculinity and potency are embossed within the cultural fantasy of the warrior -that imagining of maleness that drives social progress, power and family fecundity (Wettlaufer, 2000) . Thus, not only is the white maiden's gown a fantasy of sexual purity and allure, but the red of the Prince's military jacket represents the blood lineage, sashed by royal blue and divine right to rule; the red also represents the dangers of blood spillage that issue from supreme command. The braids of gold and white are not simply the gilded privilege of the aristocracy, but the seminal line by which the white regalia of the maiden will succumb and be fertilized.
As the watching world celebrated through frivolous or more reverential witness, the regal couple personified the might of church, state and polity -yet all the while maintaining themselves as everyday erotica and the libidinal force of human power and violence. The very fact that so many people from such diverse backgrounds celebrated the nuptial and bore witness to its potency and pleasure reflects, more than anything else, the astonishing force of this violent aesthetic and the ways in which the cultural imaginary can so miraculously refuse the implications of its joy. Through the aegis of the mediasphere, the imperial violence upon which the nuptial ultimately resides becomes diffuse as a shared fantasy of pleasure in the subjugation of its horror.
Twitter-volution
Less than five months after the wedding, the streets of London were again beamed across the planet. In the midst of ongoing global economic stress and severe governmental austerity measures in the UK, London and surrounding suburbs erupted into violent and chaotic street riots. It was as though the horrors that had been subsumed within the meticulously ritualized royal nuptial had escaped the authority and symbolic order that had contained them -as if the meticulous weave of history, hierarchy and governance that we have described above suddenly frayed and unravelled into a disorderly entanglement of somatic urges.
While beginning with community protests over a police shooting in Tottenham, the street violence rapidly escalated into something less specific and more widespread. The protest, it seems, stimulated a more seditious social apoplexy which brought adolescents and younger adults into the streets to rob and attack commercial buildings, shops, financial institutions and hotels. The global vision of the arson and larceny was framed by a peculiar carnivalesque that exposed the limits of the police and their authority, social legitimacy and capacity to control the sensate eruption and mayhem.
Bewildered by the frenzy and somatic energy of these attacks, senior police and public officials appeared nightly on the news, condemning the attacks and the apparent disregard for law and law enforcement. The British Prime Minister David Cameron was particularly scathing about the parents of these children, whom he regarded as relinquishing their personal and community responsibilities. The Prime Minister threatened the perpetrators of the mayhem that they would be detected and 'feel the full force of the law'. Commentators on the liberal left argued that the break-out was an effect of unemployment, poverty and the government's austerity measures, which had savaged England's poorest people, including particular migrant groups, the low-skilled and university students (Ponticelli and Voth, 2011) .
Reaching beyond the origin of the events in Tottenham, the 'unlawful shopping' and arson attacks spread to a number of migrant and economically strained suburbs like Brixton, and then into arts and student precincts like Salford. Excited by the mass-messaging of Twitter and other social media, the carnival of riots even reached the more middle-class suburbs like Croydon, where at least one major building was razed to the ground. While many of the rioters had adopted a Robin Hood demeanour, this coup de joyeux was soured by violent assaults and ultimately the deaths of 15 people, including three Armenian immigrants who were run down trying to protect the family store from rioters (BBC, 2011b) . News interviews with the supporters of the deceased made it clear that the assault and deaths were implicated in issues of ethnic difference, and that the Turkish-Armenian community in Manchester and Birmingham was rallying to protect its property against the marauding outsiders (SBS News, 9 August).
These ethnic fault-lines and the break-out of youthful sedition were not, however, the greatest concern of the London Mayor, Boris Johnson. For Johnson, the most significant issue was the effect of the riots on London's reputation, particularly as the city was preparing to host the 2012 Olympic Games. Like China's 2008 Olympics, the British Games represented the opportunity for the world's first industrialized and non-revolutionary democratic nation to present its ideological and economic dignity to the global community. For Johnson, the erratic and self-gratifying rioters merely sullied that grandeur with petty and hedonistic lawlessness: nothing more significant than that. The Games, like the royal wedding, restored London to the top of the world's popularity charts.
The carnivalesque of the London riots might be simply explained in terms of a riotous youth break-out, little more than a schoolyard brawling that escaped the parameters of authority through the amplitude of social media. The vision of young adolescents in hoodies and tuques contrasts radically with the royal London of gilded uniforms, tiaras and horse-drawn carriages. This is the London of state and orderly conduct, hierarchy and etiquette -the London of City Bank or the Bank of England, both of which were, remarkably, spared by the rioters and their mysterious confluence of anger, sedition and carnal exuberance.
Even with the $400 million damage bill, the 2011 coup de joyeux riots seem relatively benign, particularly in the context of ongoing financial duress in Europe and North America and the deep cuts in government spending that are clearly straining the social fabric of the city's poorest people. To this end, it might seem surprising that the rioters paid little attention to the institutional edifice of the great London banks, which represented a primary source of the economic hardships and hierarchical context through which the riots were being generated. In fact, the broadcast images of youths spiriting away 3-D TVs, designer joggers, iPhones and data screens might appear as more opportunistic than political.
Even the student riots that occurred earlier in the year, and which paralleled similar outbreaks in Italy and elsewhere in the European Union, were directly focused on government policy, especially education cuts. The August London riots, by contrast, seemed more amorphous, even hedonistic: on the surface, at least, a contrast to the city's long history of social sedition and modes of political violence. As one of the oldest cities in the modern world, in fact, London has a history of popular sedition that reaches back to the medieval period. In events like the Wat Tyler peasant revolt of 1381, English subjects and citizens have marched, protested and rioted against oppressive regimes and policies, drawing the state toward a more equitable distribution of political, social and economic pleasures. In the Wat Tyler march on London, in particular, nearly 60,000 peasants entered London and demanded an end to the poll tax, serfdom and the injustices that were being perpetrated by the feudal lords and higher echelons of the church.
While a significant number of the insurgents became distracted by the temptations of the city -drunken revelry and licentiousness (Dunn, 2004; Jones, 2009 ) -the protest nevertheless elicited significant concessions from the regent, Richard II. Through guile and deception, however, Richard ultimately revoked his concessions and had the leaders of the protests executed. While there remains considerable doubt about the contribution of the peasant riots to the evolution of British liberalism and democracy, the regent's reprisals against his subjects remind us that the regal lineage, which was so deftly sanitized in the global mediasphere's representations of the 2011 royal wedding, is forged upon the bloody and violent repression of the kingdom's own people.
To this end, the description of the August 2011 London riots as simply 'opportunistic' or an exercise in 'poor parenting' underplays important questions about the ways in which public authority and hierarchical organizational systems have become normatized in contemporary societies. In the 2011 riots, the mobs' mode of sedition was not directly focused on government or the banks, both of which were presiding over the country's financial difficulties and people's privation. For many commentators, this lack of political action and preference for looting and arson was simply a symptom of both the groups' limited political vision and the pervasive power of élites and the neoliberal ideology. In Althusserian terms, that is, the citizens at the lowest social echelon have been simply brainwashed into believing that the interests and privilege of the social élites will produce the best economic and social outcomes for all citizens (Herman and McChesney, 1998; Giroux, 2006; Fuchs, 2011) . Thus, the rioters simply supplemented their wardrobes and houses with capitalist products they otherwise couldn't afford, thinking perhaps that their petty criminality would be camouflaged from criminal prosecution in the chaos of the event.
In this light, the rioters were actually conforming to the capitalist imperative, rather than expressing any significant political point. This petty criminality contrasts with more direct political activism, such as the Occupy movement that emerged in the United States and spread to other parts of the world during 2011 and 2012. The Occupy movement was peopled by a more sophisticated and deliberately unspecified political activism which actually focused on the banks and the intensified global inequalities that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) had precipitated. By contrast with the majority of the London rioters, the Occupy movement was often populated by educated, middle-class students and political activists who sought to present an image of peaceful resistance. The contrast with the rioters was accentuated in London, where Occupiers settled around St Paul's Cathedral, challenging police to exercise violent removal under the visage of a peaceful God.
These contrasts, however, underplay the political significance of the London riots, particularly in terms of the force of hierarchy and the social discriminations that are generated through the media. While the Occupiers targeted banks and financial districts, the rioters were far more somatic in their defiance. In the midst of both the London riots and the Occupy movement, however, banks and other financial institutions have sought to present themselves as 'above politics', creating a social and economic aesthetic around pure data and economic objectivity.
In fact, the banks have marshalled their own branding systems across the mediasphere in order to create a specialized language and activity that seem impenetrable to the citizens and clients they claim to serve. This 'smokes and mirrors' effect is largely generated around the metaphor of data and a particularly deft manipulation of economic and financial knowledge systems. The banks have transformed the materiality of space and product into data, conjoining the Holocene's deep history of symbolic exchange value (see Introduction) with new forms of mediation. These new forms of mediation have extended stock market and credit processes that have accompanied the rise of the pleasure economy and consumerism into a far more elaborate and abstruse exchange metaphor.
The Global Financial Crisis (2007-) alerted us to the insidiousness of the 'libor', the on-selling of credit such that a one dollar loan can be used to sponsor a whole range of supplementary loans (Lewis, 2011) . This financial crisis, however, has also exposed the labyrinth of financial and data trading processes that are the mainstay of the whole global banking sector. Clearly, governments have surrendered much of their capacity to manage the financial sector, including the supply of money and credit. In the new global trading systems, 'value' has been almost entirely divorced from products through the leverage of speculation and time. Trading in 'futures' is perhaps the most spectacular example of this disaggregation, as traders simply imagine a future value of a given 'asset', which they then merrily buy and sell on the basis of this fantasy. While claiming a basis in 'modelling' or 'science', these fantasies are little more than the product of metaphor and claims that are generated through the global mediasphere.
It is precisely this fantasy that lies behind the unemployment lines and privations of the London suburbs.
Indeed, while the rioters' needs are both immediate and somatic, there is simply no site in which these needs can be granted within the smoke and mirrors of the global banking sector. While Bonnie and Clyde might have excised some cash from the bank vaults of the 1920s, a 2011 attack on the banks would have yielded very little for the London rioters. Even as a symbolic political gesture, there seems little that the Occupiers or rioters might actually say about the banks, since value exists only in the fantasy of pleasure and symbols that form a banking aesthetic: banks have simply buttressed themselves against the fallibility of their own invention, becoming not only 'too big to fail' but too nefarious to succeed. That is to say, the very complexity of the global financial labyrinth renders it impossible to grasp and manage the system, so banks and their critics simply function within the counterclaims of social value on the one hand and greed on the other. The Occupiers have had difficulty landing a blow on the banks because of this oscillation between impossible failure and impossible success.
In some ways, it is precisely this miasmic nature of the financial system that has enabled the banks to infuse themselves into the processes of governmentality. Thus, while the Occupiers present a gentle image through the mediasphere, leaving public officials and police to betray their intrinsic violence, the London rioters had the temerity or naïveté to attack the 'shopfront' of this collusive governmentality. That is, the rioters attacked that part of the system which was within focus and which functions, like the two-faced Janus, to control their access to goods and their symbolic value.
In an economic and governmental system that depends upon a precarious balance between the stimulation of desire and the regulatory management of access and gratification, the London rioters expressed their socially constituted frustration through a direct breach of the 'law'. The law, in this sense, refers both to the law of supply and demand and to the property laws which segregate the desirer from the desired. As we noted in the previous chapter, this economic and social stimulation of desire is mobilized through a state of dissatisfaction or 'lack'. With the redirected force of erotic desire and dissatisfaction (Baudrillard, 1998) , the desire for products is constantly stimulated through the global mediasphere.
While the rioters were comprised of numerous groups and individuals, mixing a range of dispositions and motives, there is a sense in which the London rioters created an effect of social mayhem that challenged the authority and political certitude of government and state. The appearance of Prince William in the midst of the riots and the constant presence of the Prime Minister and London Mayor all indicated a sense of threat that at least questioned the a priori nature of public authority and its particular rights to violence.
Of course, some of this was pure adolescent bravado, parading the groups' deployment of social media to organize the attacks and evade police. Prime Minister Cameron, in fact, coupled the use of social media with other manifestations of youth banditry. Along with bad parenting and a lack of respect for authority, social media were targeted as a new social evil:
Everyone watching these horrific actions will be struck by how they were organised via social media. Free flow of information can be used for good. But it can also be used for ill. (cited in Halliday, 2011) Looking to shift the blame for the riots away from government policy, the Prime Minister turned reactively to the media -a favoured scapegoat for the failings of any governmental policy. Cameron's espousal of the need to control the broadcast and social media resonated somewhat with pronouncements and strategies adopted by autocratic regimes in the Arab Uprising, where many protesters were also seeking access to a better life and products they could otherwise not afford.
In a peculiar way, however, Cameron's comments also pointed to the language wars that consistently unsettle the power élites of the global mediasphere. While these élites have infused themselves and their interests across the global mediasphere and its hierarchical knowledge and political systems, they are not able to exert absolute control. The actual extent of their control and influence, of course, is a matter of intense scholarly and public debate; however, it is very clear that events like the London riots, the Arab Uprising and Occupy illustrate the limits of control, as well as the pervasiveness of contending language wars. To put this into Lacanian terms, the symbolic web that language forms across societies and everyday life can never constitute a complete coverage. The mediasphere inevitably shifts and fractures along the lines of doubt, alternative desires and contending social claims (Hartley, 1999; Silverstone, 2007; Lewis, 2011) . David Cameron acknowledges as much in his laments over the fallibility of parenting and the media, and the ways in which young rioters showed so little respect for state authority.
These gaps in the governmental system and symbolic order necessarily facilitate, even encourage, some level of agency, resistance and autonomy for individuals and communities within the polity. Equally, and as we have noted, this autonomy and agency are also never pure or absolute, but exist within 'other' spaces and expressive contingencies. Even in the riots, these modes of resistance remained locked within the conditions of the capitalist imperative; its mode of transgression and politicism were implicated in the very forces that the rioters also sought to disrupt. That is to say, the pleasure economy became the interface for governments and governmentality on the one hand, and the rioters and transgressive politicism on the other. Meeting in the site of the pleasure economy, these respective players became contingencies of a cultural condition of crisis. This crisis was not a threat to governmental systems and law, but a clash of desires in which the rattling of pleasure and primacy was charged by anxiety and imaginings of doom.
These language wars were being played out in vicious fashion across the mediasphere, both through the action and practices of specific bodies and also in the discourses and knowledge systems that were being set against one another. The overriding imagining of doom that was articulated in the violence of the event became amplified in the cultural politics of youth, greed and governance.
To this end, it is simply naïve to dismiss the London riots as apolitical or politically irrelevant. The arson and petty larceny of the London riots were part of a challenge to the prevailing order and the pleasure economy, and simultaneously an expression of its ubiquity and organic power. Like those in the Wat Tyler revolt who became distracted by the carnal temptations of London, the young rioters in 2011 responded to the somatic stimulations and frustrations of the pleasure economyand its governmental and financial guardians.
Notwithstanding the violent margins of the rebellious community, many rioters also resembled those in the Arab Uprising whose attraction to democracy was stimulated, at least corporeally, by a desire for products and economic prosperity. The differences between the rioters and the Arab Uprising activists may be obvious in many ways, but there is also a strong similarity, at least inasmuch as both groups questioned the legitimacy of governments that neither respect nor serve the interests and needs of the community. Writing in the New York Times , Jack Ewing draws this parallel in the simplest possible termsAfter all, the ultimate measure of economic success is not whether the stock or bond markets go up -though it sometimes seems that way -but rather whether a society can provide jobs for its citizens. A society that fails will see other problems multiply in the form of political unrest, sinking tax revenue and soaring debt. (Ewing, 2011) In the context of ongoing global insecurity, financial duress and credit problems, the 'activists' in London, Greece, Spain, Italy and the Middle East are all expressing their frustration with an economic and regulatory system that consistently stimulates their desires against the modulation of supply, and the ways in which pleasure is distributed through the uneven channels of the global mediasphere.
The mediasphere and the crisis of knowing
As outlined in the Introduction, the rise of the mass media -news media in particular -is directly linked to the emergence of the modern state and liberal democracy. Institutional democracy developed in concert with mass printing and mass literacy. That is, the institutional processes that formed representative democracy evolved through mass writing technologies and culture, creating governmental and administrative systems that were conceived in terms of the capacity of the polis to read and write (Vincent, 2000; Gans, 2004) .
As numerous political theorists have noted, however, these institutional processes of representation and delegation of power appear stagnant in the light of radical shifts in communications technologies and the rise of broadcast, narrowcast and now various forms of digital and interactive mediation (Zolo, 1992; 1997; Beck, 2008; Cottle, 2009; Curran, 2011; Fuchs, 2011) . This institutional stagnation has led many theorists to consider new possibilities for civic participation and models of democracy that would prosper in a broadcast and digital media environment. In particular, these theories focus on the idea of a 'cultural' (digital or new) democracy, one that engenders cultural-community participation and the creative engagement of media audiences in everyday meaning-making and practice. This creative participation often fosters a subconscious and somatic resistance to the overbearing conditions that persist in hierarchically and instrumentally organized mass society (de Certeau, 1984 (de Certeau, , 1988 Fiske, 1989; McKee, 2008) .
While this approach to media and cultural politics constitutes a specific zone of 'popular culture' studies, as we noted in the previous chapter, its zones have been extended into a particular enthusiasm for the interactive digital media as a new site for community-building and participative democracy (Poster, 2004; Boler, 2009) . In either case, we might usefully talk in terms of a broadcast democracy, and an internet or digital democracy (Lewis, 2002 (Lewis, , 2008 Hartley, 1991; Hartley and Green, 2005) .
From this perspective, the media need to be understood as much more than a teleological or deterministic set of industries and practices that function within a given political and policy context. As noted in the Introduction, this conception of a unitary, integrated and deterministic media has spawned a school of media scholars who frequently focus their critique on the news media and their social and political responsibilities. Invoking a paradigm of objectivity to attack much of the commercial, mass news media, these critics seek to reclaim the news as the primary instrument of a Truth that informs an effective, functioning democracy (Keane, 1991; Herman and McChesney, 1998; Cottle, 2006; Curran, 2011) .
This idea of the news media as the 'fourth estate' of society, which informs citizens and enables them to make objective and rational decisions, continues to have considerable scholarly and professional traction. The various centres for independent journalism have been established across the planet as anathema to the tsunami of public relations and other forms of 'positioned' news reporting that has evolved during the rise of mass communication (Rampton, 2002; Stauber, 2002) . Indeed, the fourth estate model is frequently invoked as the critical antithesis to state and corporate hegemonies which seek to impose their own interests and neoliberal ideology as 'false objectivity' (Norris, 2009) .
For a number of scholars this fourth estate model has several fundamental limitations. First, it relies on a grounded notion of an objective truth, thus ignoring the role of language and discourse in the formation of any given 'truth'; second, it underestimates the importance of everyday life and culture, and the multiple and complex ways in which audiences engage with text in order to generate meaning (Lewis, 2008); third, it restricts its understanding on the political sphere to the institutional processes associated with democracy (Agamben, 2003; Badiou, 2004; Zizek, 2006) .
While resisting a populist, celebrational or post-essentialist frame of analysis, a particular cohort of media scholars has nevertheless attempted to weld an interest in everyday culture with a rigorous analysis of the cultural politics of the media. Thus, Jürgen Habermas's (1998) conceptions of the 'public sphere' and 'communicative action' are supplemented through their integration with various media-based concepts such as the literary sphere (McGuigan, 2005) , the cultural public sphere (Hartley and Green, 2006) and the mediapolis (Silverstone, 2007) .
My own application of the term 'mediasphere' differs somewhat from John Hartley's coinage (see Hartley, 1999) . My own use acknowledges that media are a site of convergence, drawing media producers, texts and audiences into interflowing relationships through which meanings are generated (Lewis, 2002 (Lewis, , 2005 (Lewis, , 2008 (Lewis, , 2011 . This approach to mediation deconstructs the assumption that places the media industries and institutions at the pinnacle of the mediation process. Rather than thinking in terms of media messages that are delivered from a public sphere into a private realm, the mediasphere model conceives of 'meaning' as the interflow of the public and private spheres through the individual's social and cultural relationships. The mediasphere is the cauldron by which meanings are generated, exchanged and amplified through the complex alchemy of culture.
Like all other social phenomena, these meanings and processes of meaning-making are subject to the cultural politics and organizing processes of economic competition and social hierarchy. The mediasphere constitutes a space in which individuals and social groups congregate and generate their discourses, meanings and imaginings through relationships that may foster various continuities and collaborations of shared understanding and knowledge. It is also the site in which meanings atrophy or are contested through the exercise of desire and practices that generate pleasure and the displeasures associated with exclusion, subjugation, control, resistance and violence. The mediasphere draws together the practices and imaginings that abound through everyday life into the zone of historically constituted culture and knowledge systems.
The mediasphere is never fixed or final, and its meanings are never absolute; it does not produce a false consent or consensus or single ideological faith system, but is always subject to the dynamic shifts and fracturing that culture and cultural innovation perpetually elicit. To this end, the mediasphere is the site in which desires are generated and marshalled through the infinite field of imagining which are themselves the nebulae of various modes of cultural consciousness, social motifs, community frames, sensibilities and identity formation.
As we have noted above, the mediasphere is replete with complex cultural agonisms or 'language wars' that are organized around hierarchical knowledge systems. While individuals and social groups seek to establish themselves and their cultural and political claims, they are constantly frustrated by the interests and desires of others. To this end, the mediasphere and its constituent contentions in imagining and knowing resist the constellation of absolute knowledge and ideology. Thus, while large institutions seek to modulate the supply-demand axis in order to modulate and control the value of pleasure, the stability of this axis is continually disrupted by the unpredictability of pleasure itself and its conduit through social meaning-making. To put this in economic terms, 'the market' remains elusive, as the meaning of pleasure is subject to the complexities of culture, counter-desires and intrinsic language wars. That is, social agents and 'consumers' create their own meanings and pleasures beyond the strictures of imposed knowledge.
The Arab Uprising and the London riots are, as much as anything else, examples of the fallibility of the hierarchical system and its efforts to impose knowledge as absolute. These events are also examples of the ways in which the mediasphere is subject to the precariousness of everyday meaning-making and desires, and more particularly the ways in which desire is implicated in the cultural dynamic of crisis and eschatological imagining. The perpetually disputable nature of meanings -even as they are amplified through the mediasphere and may parade themselves as Truth -are subject to the conditions of crisis and multiplying complexity that have characterized the whole of the Holocene period.
Language wars, astroturfing and digital dissent
Language wars are the constituents of social change and crisis (Lewis, 2005 (Lewis, , 2010 . Various social groups and institutions struggle against one another in order to exercise control over the language vortex that is created through crisis. As we saw in the events of 9/11, the American government rushed into the void of the attacks and sought to establish a new framework of knowing by which 'good' could be defined against the 'evil' of Islamist terrorism. The meaning lack, that is, became swelled with a voluble and extreme language of violence. In the period since those events the whole notion of 'Islam' has become revised and reworked in western states, as they have struggled to understand themselves and the calamity of this new epoch of conflict.
Thus, any 'event' is subject to the claims and variable complexities of the mediasphere. The event, that is, becomes framed as language; hence the problematics of 'lack': an event is never 'pure' or 'true' but is, rather, the subject of variable knowledge claims that are formed around a specific narrative of desire and the cultural politics of pleasure. Of course, as we have noted, social élites have a disproportionate access to language and meditational resources: élite groups and institutions, in particular, are able to foster their own interests and truth claims over less socially enabled individuals and groups. In this context, as we have noted, élites seek to impose themselves over crisis events in which the normative meanings are ruptured and a 'lack' emerges through the cultural fissures of language and language wars.
Even so, the 'truth' is never a complete coverage, but will always be challenged by the artifice of its own claims to purity, which, in turn, is constituted over its intrinsic 'lack' -that is, the fallibility and precariousness of its 'meaning'. This fallibility is engendered by the inevitability of alternative claims, cultural instability and alternative language wars. In this context, the royal wedding was propagated as a 'ubiquitous cultural truth', a pure imagining that would redefine the regency's long history of violence and social oppression. Within four months this imagining had collapsed as the London streets erupted in dissent and violence.
The argument here, therefore, is that these knowledge systems are the predicate of language wars and the dynamic of cultural politics, change and crisis. The media's continual invocation of apocalyptic imagining, in this context, is simply a concession to the precariousness of these truth-claims and the dynamics that drive cultural transformation.
For many commentators, in fact, the collapse of unitary knowledge systems represents an underlying social and cultural crisis of knowledge. Matthew Hindman (2009) and James Curran (2011), for example, lament the atrophy of investigative and professional journalism, particularly through the surrender of news objectivity and a powerful social critique. On the other hand, enthusiasts of the newer, interactive media often celebrate this deconstruction of unitary or absolute knowledge, arguing that such conceptions merely serve the interests of powerful élites who are able to exert the most voluble claims to such Truth. At least inasmuch as the new media provide an alternative terrain to the old media and political empires, these digital utopians (digitopians) proclaim a new political and cultural dawning.
As we noted in the Introduction, many of these digitopians proclaim the interactive media as the harbinger of a more participative democracy. This is not simply an extension of 'hacktivism' (Lewis, 2008) , but the use of social media and other community forums to engender public participation in the political process. That is, while hacktivism represents a digital assault by minorities against governments and corporations, social media enable a broad spread of political engagement, including the sorts of populist uprising that have been occurring in the Middle East.
More broadly, however, the social media, blogosphere, wikis, and file-sharing sites like YouTube have created new opportunities for the distribution of a much more diverse range of social and political imaginings and perspectives. Anticipated somewhat by the digitopians of the 1990s, these participative sites have enabled individuals and communities across the world to connect, organize and generate various forms of political campaigning, information-sharing, community and identity-building.
While used initially for social networking, sexual courting and various forms of visual pleasure exchange, these social media have become a critical feature of conventional and more community and common-green political participation. This concept of 'networking' is far from new, with various conceptions of a mediated, post-industrial society pre-dating the introduction of the World Wide Web and the associated exponential expansion of interactive communications systems (van Dijk, 1991; Castells, 2010) . The idea of interactive media networking, however, has gathered significant disciples who are convinced that the interconnection of these systems represents a new cultural and political epoch (Hassan, 2004) .
Manuel Castells (2010) speaks for many of the network evangelists when he declares that the interconnected digital system constitutes the only true democratic medium. While not specifying exactly what that means, Castells paves the way for other evangelists who are convinced that networking and the social media are the primary agents in the 2011 Middle East revolutions. The use of YouTube, Facebook and Twitter is seen as the primary conduit for information dissemination and political organizing. In the context of the Arab Uprisings, many digitopians have seen a new democratic agency emerging, one that will enable the elision of hierarchical and oppressive structures:
The power of the Egyptian revolution is, therefore, indicative of the power that thrives within and defines complex systems networks. As society becomes more and more defined by and reliant upon networks to organize and manipulate the realms of finance, politics and industry, a tremendous democratic and seemingly horizontal shift free of singular hierarchical organization and defined by weak, albeit fluid connections, must take place. (O'Connell, 2011: 25) These 'weak' systems, as Carrie O'Connell (2011) argues, are defined by their humanity -their sociability. According to many network theorists, social systems like Facebook are empowered by the spread of compassion which has the capacity to transcend national borders and elicit our common humanity (Lim, 2011) .
In Egypt, in particular, young protesters rallied around two Facebook sites -'April 6 Youth Movement', founded in 2008, and 'We are all Khaled', founded in 2010 after government troops brutally murdered a young blogger, Khaled Said. The Khaled killing, like that of Neda Soltan in Iran, became the focus of widespread local and international condemnation after vision of the assault was posted on YouTube and then transferred across to the mainstream media. With remarkably few constraints on broadcast and interactive media, the Facebook pages represented a totem for political activism and organizing in Egypt.
Using Twitter and mobile devices, political activists infiltrated the political and moral conscience of broad spans of the Egyptian population.
These same facilities, of course, were used by the London rioters, although their sedition was not endorsed by Western governments as it lay outside the parameters of their political and hierarchical norms. As we noted, British Prime Minister David Cameron was scornful of the rioters and any suggestion that social media enhanced 'democratic participation': the new media and their putative democratic disposition were just a façade for crime and disrespect for duly elected government and public authority. No such reservations were expressed in Libya, where NATO and anti-government troops destroyed social, economic and government infrastructure in order to support their own version of democracy.
The point here is that the technologies that have been so welcomed by various social commentators and digital enthusiasts have no intrinsic social value except in terms of their deployment within specific political contentions and language wars. That is, network computing generally, and social media in particular, are only valuable in terms of the cultural politics in which they are set. While digitopians might insist that social media and networking are fundamentally humane, liberatory or sociable, these functions may be just as easily set in order to enhance governmentality, surveillance and organizational systems that suppress minorities and foster various forms of social hierarchy and violence.
Thus, while we will be well aware of the use of networking systems for surveillance and élite institutional information distribution and exchange, there has also been an increasing tendency for authorities to deploy Facebook and other systems to impose their interests on everyday citizens in everyday contests. Digitopians may dismiss this trend as a form of 'false consciousness' that cannot be considered 'social' or 'friendly', and hence it remains outside the definable parameters of social networking. Even so, the emergence of propaganda and public lobbying practices that give the impression of a 'grass roots' movement has become increasingly prevalent in the network and online environment (Monbiot, 2011). The generic name for this practice, 'astroturfing', derives from the idea that astroturf is an artificial grass surface: public relations companies have evolved various practices and mechanisms for giving the impression that a particular policy, product or idea attracts strong public support.
Using old media and various forms of public relations strategies during the 1980s, tobacco companies were particularly active in generating an impression of public support (Freeman and Chapman, 2010) . While they are now prohibited from broadcast advertising in much of the Western world, many tobacco companies are using Facebook and other social media to generate new campaigns that give an impression of public interest and activity. This model is now stock-in-trade for a range of corporations, propagandists, political lobbyists and public authorities. Indeed, a whole new generation of activists, professional media workers and software applications have evolved around the social media and the 'impression' of public activity. In particular, these individuals and groups generate a range of texts that are published in the blogosphere, social networking sites, YouTube and a range of online forums. While these social media sites are often designed around the everyperson and community activity, activists and professionals invade the sites with very specific political or commercial purposes.
One of these strategies is to generate false identities or 'personas', releasing those imagined persons (astroturfers) into various forms of social media activity. George Monbiot (2011) describes the use of specifically designed 'persona management' software which multiplies the identity of astroturfers on a site, creating the impression of popular activity around a significant issue. Listing their interests through Facebook and other sites, the astroturfers are able to populate a given political zone: 'Fake accounts can be kept updated by automatically reposting or linking to content generated elsewhere, reinforcing the impression that the account holders are real and active' (Monbiot, 2011) .
While such strategies have been used by the Chinese government for several years, the US military has also commissioned a Californian software developer to generate a persona management programme that would enable US military personnel to manage up to ten false identities in the social media at any one time. This strategy 'will allow the US military to create a false consensus in online conversations, crowd out unwelcome opinions and smother commentaries or reports that do not correspond with its own objectives' (Fielding and Cobain, 2011).
While there is no sense in which the online activism that supported the Arab Uprisings was generated by anyone other than local people and their supporters in the international community, the interventions of organizations like the US military in Facebook and other social media casts doubt on the digitopians' claims about the democratic validity of the network underground. The US government and its military are not abashed about such interventions, and there can be little doubt that in the context of global cyber-wars these sorts of interventions occur beneath the banner of America's cultural and political hegemony and the mission of global liberal-democratic ideologies.
The exposure of astroturfing and other manufactured interventions reminds us of the ways in which technologies are subject to broader cultural politics and language wars. In the misty enthusiasm for social media and their role in the democratic insurgencies, we need to remind ourselves that the overthrow of despotic regimes in Egypt and Tunisia was not an effect of Western technological brilliance. The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia, in particular, were fostered around the constellation of historical conditions and a crisis which involved the courage and sacrifice of protesters. The Egyptian regime, in particular, was weakened by its own despotism and the atrophy of its autocratic stranglehold on the people's will. Of course, the various communication systems played a role in the revolutions, but they were not pivotal, nor did they lead to an immanently humane political transformation, as the digitopians might have expected. The Arab Uprising, in fact, was a bleak event. Many people were injured and killed, and the outcomes remain ambiguous. Through this crisis of violence, a new political and semiotic condition emerged as new knowings in the fracturing of an older knowledge system. The crisis of the Arab Uprisings was as horrible as it was purposeful and hopeful.
Back to the hack: julian assange and WikiLeaks
John Humphrey: The very broad allegation that's been made over and over again in the media over recent days is that you're some sort of sexual predator who has sex with a large number of young women, ideally without a condom, and that you do it because you can, effectively, because in some cases they're groupies or they're enthralled to your fame or whatever it is. Are you a sexual predator? Julian Assange:
That's ridiculous. Of course not ... Women have been extremely helpful and generous. (Humphrey, 2010) For a number of hacker activists, so-called 'hacktivists', the social media have very little intrinsic value, other than as a mechanism for the distribution of information. The hacktivist mantra, 'all information to all people', suggests that hacking into the secure information system of any corporate or government institution is justifiable on the basis of the fourth estate principle. The hacker's job is to retrieve that information; the deployment and shaping of that information for political and cultural change is really a matter for the people. Certainly, this is the view of one of the most famous of recent hacktivists, Julian Assange. Describing himself merely as a 'publisher', Assange has taken the view that the re-formation of global power and politics is vested primarily in a pure fourth estate model. To this end, it is citizens themselves who should interrogate and shape available information, thus ensuring that governments are truly 'responsible' and 'representative' of the people's genuine interests (Khatchadourian, 2010) . Because the news media and professional journalists are mixed and often unreliable, even reactionary, Assange seeks direct delivery of information to citizens via the Internet.
For Assange and his organization, WikiLeaks, there is a genuine political bliss in the state of unconditional knowing, precisely the 'all information to all people at all times' that Nicholas Negroponte (1995) had envisaged in the emergence of the World Wide Web. This all-knowing, as we noted in the Introduction, was the curse of curiosity that Lot's wife had suffered as she looked back upon the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Despite the Biblical warning and the violence of modern, political biblioclasm, Assange's WikiLeaks defied the will of democratic governments and released online reams of classified information, much of which had been sourced from hacktivists and other political activists across the world.
This approach to the publishing of classified information has been widely condemned by both totalitarian and democratic governments and officials, including the American military and Presidential Office. Conservative public commentators like William Kristol (2010) were so outraged by this putative breach of national security that they encouraged the indictment of Assange for 'treason'. Writing in The Washington Times , Jeffrey Kuhner (2010) asks seriously whether or not Assange should be assassinated, as he poses the same security threat as the worst kind of anti-US terrorist. An Australian citizen, Assange has been abandoned by his country's Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, who also declared that the publication of classified diplomatic cables warranted Assange's arrest (Gordon, 2010).
Assange's digital utopia is shaped by a rather bleak vision that focuses specifically on the power of the state and governments to control the basic conditions of public knowing. Assange views government with deep suspicion, regarding their threats to his own freedom as another manifestation of the state's self-ascribed right to censor, oppress and violate the freedom of ordinary citizens. Claiming no specific ideological or national allegiance, Assange sees his mission as simply breaking the cell of censorialism and secrecy by which modern governments exert their biopolitics against genuine somatic and intellectual emancipation.
In fact, the actual security implications of the published material seem somewhat ambiguous, not least because WikiLeaks releases material from a range of security interests and nations, including the United States, the Taliban, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and China (WikiLeaks, 2011) . Often, too, many of the more spectacular leaks, especially from the US, are really restricted for ideological as much as strategic reasons. Washington's efforts to maintain some level of public support for largely unwinnable wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been fostered through a highly managed and restrictive public information and media campaign (Waldman, 2004; Lewis, 2005; Keeble and Mair, 2010) . The WikiLeaks publication in 2010 of the 2007 US Apache helicopter attack on Iraqi journalists created both outrage across the planet and embarrassment for the US military and government. Along with the release of American fatality figures, the Apache leak was less a question of national security and more an issue of public perception and support for their leaders' decisions and invasion of Iraq.
By the time of the leaks, in fact, public support for the war had waned significantly in Coalition nations. WikiLeaks merely confirmed the deep suspicions that were already widespread across the global mediasphere and first world citizenry. Significantly, too, the information that was released through WikiLeaks and other social networking sites like YouTube became a significant source for the broadcast media.
As with the Egyptian revolution of 2011, the transference of vision published on YouTube into the mainstream media elicited widespread public consternation and lobbying. However, while WikiLeaks merely reproduced the material verbatim, the mass news media managed and arranged the stories in terms of their broader political indices and interests ('news values'), forming it into accessible and attractive narratives for mass media audiences. This was particularly important as a significant proportion of the first world public continue to use broadcast media as a primary news source, even where that broadcast material is distributed online (see Project for Excellence in Journalism, 2010).
The eschatological sensibilities of the media inevitably inscribed the WikiLeaks' material with libidinal and dramatic tones. To this end, Assange himself was escalated as a media celebrity, a 'cause celebre', whose private life and personal mission became centralized in the mediated pleasure economy. Indeed, while the leaks and the mission of political transparency remained significant for the 'serious media', these issues were supplemented by wider media interest into Assange's sexual practices, particularly in terms of sexual misconduct charges in Sweden.
Assange's arrest and proposed extradition to Sweden to face charges of 'sex by surprise' exposed the digital anarchist to an ethical scrutiny that was distinctly removed from the high-minded mission of media transparency. Indeed, while debates around the actual legitimacy of the Swedish prohibition of 'sex by surprise' abound, the moral authority of Assange's mission has been sullied, or at very least been reduced to a more commonly human level of carnality. For all his esteemed courage and brilliance, the digital anarchist is being reimagined in the corporeal desires and fantasies to which we are all subject. Like the tragic heroes described by Aristotle, Assange has succumbed to the tragic flaw of his desires and escalation as a media celebrity.
The empire strikes back
The sex by surprise charges brought some comfort to Assange's critics, particularly as the women making the complaints were supporters of the transparency cause. For many Assange supporters, however, the accusations represented a strategic intervention by American intelligence operatives who believed that, once Assange had been extradited to Sweden, he could then be brought to America to face serious charges of sedition or conspiracy.
In contrast to this rather prurient celebrity interest in Assange's sex life, the arrest of one of WikiLeaks' major hacker informants, US military serviceman Bradley Manning, went almost unnoticed. Living in the shadow of Assange's ideological mission and (hetero-)sexual primacy, Manning represents that otherness of the mediasphere, the persona non grata who has been marooned in the great lineage of state-based biblioclasm. Assange made 'good copy', eliciting the media drivers of sex, celebrity and conflict; by contrast, Manning seems darkly misanthropic, amoral and strangely impotent against the brutal instrumentalism of the American state and its military machinery. As the person who putatively hacked the US military network and passed on information to WikiLeaks, Manning has been condemned to solitary confinement and various forms of sensory deprivation and torture ( New York Times Editorial, 2011; Greenwald, 2012) . For the mainstream media at least, Manning has been treated as a social contaminant, an opportunist, somewhat akin to the London rioters.
Indeed, even Manning's gay sexuality seems to confirm his status as social outsider, contrasting again with the vibrant potency by which Assange has been inscribed in the imagining of women's magazines and the liberal project. Seemingly less concerned with the high principles of free speech and media transparency, Manning appears more directly to be raging against the powerful hierarchies and systems that have oppressed him personally, and continually placed him at the lowest end of the social gradient.
Unlike Captain Yolanda Hewitt Vaughan, who was court-martialled for conscientiously refusing to serve in Iraq (see Goodman and Goodman, 2004) , Manning welcomed the tour of duty, seeing it largely as an opportunity for personal redemption. In notes and emails that Manning exchanged through various confidants, Manning expressed his desire to serve his country and explore an heroic fantasy that had been violently repressed in a poor relationship with his father.
Manning quickly realized, however, that his survival and success in war necessitated the compromise or erasure of other dimensions of his humanity, including, and most importantly, a disposition to disobedience and compassion that lay outside the rules of military engagement. Like the prison warders at Abu Ghraib who found an outlet for their emotional disjunction through sex games and their cameras, Manning turned to the computer, social networking and ultimately hacking as a relief from the grimness of the war.
Indeed, also like Private Lynndie England, who mobilized her sex and sexuality in the seditious resistance to US military instrumentalism (Lewis and Lewis, 2006) , Manning seemed to have experienced a deep sense of alienation, not simply because the war was brutal and fatuous, but because it oppressed his own human tenderness and desire for sexual intimacy. In this sense, too, both Manning and England resemble the London rioters who had no capacity to denounce or articulate their sense of humiliation and outrage as the conscripts of a brutal social hierarchy in which they were born to the lowest social gradient. The youths stole products that would make them glitter within their communities and economies of pleasure; Lynndie created photographic motifs of sexual potency; Manning used his position to expose the weaknesses in the structures that sought to demean and control him.
It is as if Manning's sexual identity simply breaks out in a form of resistance that is intimately bound to his sense of social and personal outrage. In a report in The Washington Post , Ellen Nakashima describes the series of messages that Manning sent to Adrian Lamo, a 'former hacker', who eventually reported the soldier to military authorities. According to Nakashima, Manning had already been reprimanded for security breaches and demoted for assault, and was awaiting early discharge for a diagnosed 'adjustment disorder' (Nakashima, 2011. Even so, through hubris or self-delusion, the military command continued to provide Manning with access to classified information, which confirmed for the young intelligence officer that the state was itself a vague, unstable and brutishly stupid institution. After releasing secret footage of a US helicopter attack on unarmed and innocent Iraqi civilians, Manning wrote to Lamo: Following the release of the helicopter attacks vision, which went viral on the Web and mainstream global media, Manning released a compendium of classified diplomatic documents, which WikiLeaks gradually published during 2010-11. During the parade of the Julian Assange sex scandals, Lamo betrayed Manning, claiming that he was concerned about the possible risks to American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this respect, Manning was snared by the paradox of a democratic system that he sought to enhance through his own vaguely imagined cultural politics and personal identity-building. In May 2010 Manning was arrested and held in solitary confinement, supposedly on suicide watch ( New York Times Editorial, 2011; Greenwald, 2012) .
Manning's engagement in the high drama of global hacktivism and democratic contention was embedded in his own personal struggles with friendship, sexuality, desire, trust and love. In seeking some greater purpose in his life against the repressive power and ineptitude of his military minders, Manning reached out to Lamo to break the soldier's sense of political and moral isolation. More particularly, Manning sought allegiance and friendship with someone whom he believed to be a moral ally, someone who understood the greater good of his imagining. The messages to Lamo, in fact, reflect not only Manning's disillusionment with the US government, the military and the occupation of Iraq, but also his personal desire for community and self-validation. He is not only 'self-medicating like crazy', but self-interrogating within the broader context of his duty and connection to society.
As reported on the Channel 4 News (2010), Manning's teenage years were spent establishing a pre-Facebook social networking site as a quest for community engagement and connection -the basis of what many network digitopians promote as a model of participative e-democracy. In this sense, Manning's democratic rendering contrasts with Adam Lamo's betrayal, which, he claims, was motivated by the ideals of utility, state allegiance and a conception of the greater good of the greater number.
Like the media-makers who produced the Abu Ghraib photographs, Manning finds himself in a deplorable human condition by which the US military squeezes its low-ranked service personnel into a rigid and violent hierarchy. As a low-ranked serviceman, Manning's humanity is defined in terms of an absolute obedience to the ideology of institutional power and a self-validating symbolic order. Manning's resistance is both systemic-symbolic and deeply personal: 'Regularly ignored ... except when I had something essential ... then it was back to "bring me coffee, then sweep the floor" ... [I] felt like I was an abused work horse' (cited on Channel 4 News, 2010).
The emperor's new (new) clothes
New technologies -media technologies in particular -are frequently introduced through utopian and progressivist discourses (McChesney, 2007; Kovarik, 2011) . We have already noted that the emergence of the World Wide Web in the 1990s brought a similar burst of political and cultural utopianism, proclaiming a 'second media age ' (Poster, 1995) and new forms of digital, network democracy (Castells, 2010) . Out of the community of culture jammers and hacktivists, the most recent incarnation of social mediation has stimulated another volley of prescience and political optimism, particularly around social media, mobile devices and various forms of citizen journalism.
As noted above, the notion of citizen journalism has been lionized in discussions around social and political reform, particularly in the context of popular uprisings in the Middle East during 2011. The mobile phone, in particular, is seen as the primary device for this new type of amateur public interest journalism. As a direct networking facility, these mobile devices have the capacity to record and upload events and information almost instantaneously. With over 4 billion mobile telephony devices on the planet, the social and political worlds are now ubiquitously under surveillance. Mediation and information-sharing are now easier than ever, making it virtually impossible for despotic regimes to commit any kind of socially repressive act without detection and judgement (Allan and Thorsen, 2009).
As noted in our discussion of networking, however, this capacity for mobile surveillance also cuts against the citizenry, particularly as states engage in various forms of biopolitical control and governmentality. In his analysis of new media and democracy, Matthew Hindman (2009) argues that this capacity for surveillance is as pernicious as it is of benefit. David Lyon (2007) argues a similar case, noting that the capacity for state surveillance has been vastly enhanced by the availability of the new digital modes of vision and communication. These devices are mobilized through an equally formidable ideological network of governance which is constituted through social anxiety, the most compelling example of which has emerged through the threat of terrorism. This threat, as we have also noted, enables the state to justify itself against the swathe of internal and external threat (see also Lewis, 2005 Lewis, , 2010 .
Paul Virilio (1994 Virilio ( , 2002 makes clear that the new war machines and their 'optic systems' have greatly enhanced the capacity of states to prosecute their violence against citizens of alien territories from secure distances. This point has been made by others, such as Jean Baudrillard, who notes that the application of the new communications technologies has created a strange imaginary of violence by which wars have become televisualized and seemingly abstracted from the actual conditions of harm and death (Baudrillard, 1991 (Baudrillard, , 2002 . In the current incarnation of guerrilla war and terrorism in the Middle East, mobile phones have become part of the international war machinery, being used frequently in the detonation of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and ongoing information exchanges between warring parties. This is to say that there is nothing intrinsically positive or democratic about devices that are so conveniently marshalled for killing non-combatants and combatants alike; for all their potential in the language wars of the mediasphere, mobile communications devices are as critical to violence and oppression as they are to pleasure and liberation.
For Matthew Hindman, in fact, the claim that computer systems enhance the public sphere and citizen access to information is vastly overstated (also Fuchs, 2011; Curran, 2011) . The test of an enhanced public sphere, Hindman argues, is its capacity to enable public voices that are 'clear, loud, and equal' (Hindman, 2009: 6) . Hindman makes the point that, while the Internet has been frequently proclaimed as a political and social site that reduces gatekeeping and enhances public political participation and access to information, these facilities are, in fact, quite restricted and shaped by a range of internal online hierarchical structures. These hierarchies are ultimately a reflection of the differentiations that are pervasive across the social sphere, even within first world nations.
While this point has been frequently made in terms of a digital divide and uneven access to the high-tech mediasphere, there are also significant hierarchies inscribed into the Internet itself. Writing from a critical theory perspective, Christian Fuchs (2011) concludes that the claim that Web 2.0 (social networking) enhances participatory democracy is dubious, at least inasmuch as the Web 2.0 discourses constitute their own form of imperialist ideology. Indeed, for Fuchs the very notion of participation is fundamentally normative, defining for political agents a mechanism and practice that ascribe a utopian value to a particular kind of social participation (2011: 290). Participation does not necessarily involve an alternative social conception or respect for otherness; it is simply participation.
Matthew Hindman (2009) also considers this notion of participation in broader terms, arguing that the very notion of 'access' is of questionable cultural or political value. Hindman argues that there is a vast divide between upload publishing and actually being read. Very few bloggers and citizen journalists actually attract an audience; the vast majority of bloggers remain at the margins of the global mediasphererarely read and largely insignificant. Moreover, Hindman argues, the bloggers infrequently conduct any genuine investigative journalism or raise new and innovative issues; rather, bloggers generally follow, or comment on, the mainstream media, even as they are published in the online environment. This notion of a citizen journalism movement is thus vastly exaggerated; bloggers are simply a conduit or adjunct to the mainstream of information and presiding knowledge systems.
The bloggers who are read are usually linked to major news sources and are generated by professional journalists or academics who represent an élite and highly restrictive knowledge base anyway -precisely that group of gatekeepers who are already socially privileged. In this sense, the new knowledge revolution is barely a shift from those zones of influence and liberal critique that already exist. While social websites like YouTube might present data from the margins, the analysis and meaning of data are generally organized through privileged knowledge systems and knowledge caretakers.
Indeed, while the shift to online news is well recognized, the concomitant atrophy of printed and even television news is not as significant as it seems at first glance. Much of the reading of online journalism is not generated by 'citizens' but, rather, increasingly by centralized and globalized news providers like AP, CNN, BBC and News Ltd. While increasing numbers of people are reading news online (Pew, 2011) , the news sources are increasingly aggregated through major corporate news organizations.
Indeed, the rise of 'alternative' news sources like al-Jazeera might seem radical, but even this organization is mostly comprised of BBC-trained professional journalists. The smaller and local news organizations, in fact, are being largely subsumed by these multinational news corporations, even though they are increasingly generating their news through globalizing and homogenizing online platforms. For James Curran (2011), this concentration of news organizations is regrettable in a context where journalism professionalism is declining and info-tainment style journalism is dominating the news services. Citizen journalism and blogging, therefore, might not enhance professional and investigative journalism, but merely add further to its more general atrophy.
Moreover, the infrastructure of the Net, particularly as navigations are predetermined through search engines, remains a critical factor in determining political force and content:
The pattern of links that lead to a site also largely determines its rank in search engine results. Because of the infrastructure of the Internet, then, not all choices are equal. Some sites consistently rise to the top of Yahoo!'s and Google's search results; some sites never get indexed by search engines at all. The visibility of political content on the Internet follows winners-take-all patterns, with profound implications for political voice. (Hindman, 2009: 15) In fact, the Google revolution, which radically enhanced the logarithmic power of site searching, also embedded into the Net a new billion-dollar industry and a hierarchical system that inevitably privileged those businesses and interests that are prepared to pay for high ranking in the find pages. The research on this is quite clear: users generally restrict themselves to reading only those sites that appear on the first page of a search result, ignoring that vast array of minor sites and interests that might be indexed (or absent) from all subsequent results pages (Pan et al ., 2007) . Thus, the idea of 'all information to all people at all times' is rendered nonsensical in a hierarchical system that privileges particular knowledge systems over others.
The same, of course, is true for YouTube, which sorts its searches in terms of volume of hits: the more popular the site, the more privileged the listing. While we have already discussed astroturfing in the context of social networking, the same practices of manipulation have been adopted by businesses and other interests in both Google and YouTube listings. This organizational structure clearly transgresses the optimism of hypertext enthusiasts who had predicted in the 1990s that the more open and 'rhizomatic' networking structure of computer-mediated communication would do away with the hierarchical, linear and logocentric structures that are privileged in books, essays and newspapers (see Landow, 1992; Lewis, 2000 Lewis, , 2002 Lewis, , 2010 Castells, 2010 . Rhizomes and pathways were offered as a metaphor that would direct knowledge away from the logos toward new zones of emancipated knowing, subjectivity and expressivity (Guattari, 1992) .
Social mediation and sexual desire
Even where they concede that the older hierarchies persist, the digital utopians remain fixed in their faith in the network, new subjectivities and social media. In a more convincing way, this utopianism lionizes the pleasures of infinite connectivity and the free flow of community and libido. In this respect, social media and share sites like YouTube are seen primarily in terms of their enjoyment, sexual courting and friendship. They are, in this respect, part of a pleasure-web, a cultural democracy that is formed around the gift domain of the pleasure economy. Not surprisingly, therefore, the most popular activities on both Facebook and YouTube are fostered around community-building, sexual play, jokes, sexual imagery and celebrity. This is not to marginalize or demean the other, more serious mobilization of the sites; it is simply to put them into perspective. Not surprisingly, therefore, political theorists like Christian Fuchs (2011) and Danillo Zolo (2010a) remain sceptical, fearing that the convergence of distracting pleasures and powerful institutions will continue to restrain the democratic potential of the new media:
They say the electronic agora will cease to be a myth and will usher in an era of 'democracy of immediate referenda'. I do not see any reasons for such optimism. The asymmetric, selective, and non-interactive nature of electronic communications is unlikely to change in the future. There won't be more opportunity for users either to choose information they receive or criticize it. The independence of users will be at even greater risk because the strategies of multimedia communications will tend to use covert persuasion. (Zolo, 2010) Sherry Turkle (2011), who was one of the more strident digitopians of the 1990s, has recently rescinded some of her utopian prescience, arguing that the social media are not necessarily a positive contributor to human well-being and sense of connectedness. For Turkle, the social media and related smart technologies are symptomatic of a pandemic of social alienation. When individuals go into Facebook or online dating sites, they are expressing their own isolation, which they then share with alien others. While not specifying a Lacanian derivation, Turkle describes the experience of online sexual play and courting as a convergence of desperate desire and a loneliness that cannot be genuinely satisfied by de-corporealized interaction.
And, certainly, both popular and scholarly critiques of Facebook raise similar issues. As the world's most populous online social networking site, Facebook has around 750 million users, nearly half of whom connect each day, and over 250 million of whom use mobile devices to connect (Facebook, 2011) . Like so many other websites, Facebook began as a kind of inspired digital doodling that expressed itself as resistance to institutional authority and digital orthodoxies (Mezrith, 2009 ). According to Ben Mezrith, the founding of Facebook represents 'a tale of sex, money, genius and betrayal'. These elements, of course, endow the movie version of the narrative with a particular dramatic and eschatological momentum, imagining the founder, Mark Zuckerberg, as a desperate and lonely geek whose personal desire for connection and success leads inevitably to deceit, enmity and loss.
The film, Social Network (David Fincher, 2010) , engages with the Zuckerberg story through these imaginings of social incompetence and the programming of social network packages that began with 'Facemash' -a student popularity site which was created through Harvard University's server system and was regarded as vaguely sexist and a breach of student privacy. Facemash was highlighted by the film because it established the archetype of a Facebook site that continues to balance the possibilities of social connectivity with voyeurism and problems of privacy. These questions of salaciousness and privacy are an essential component of the Facebook paradox, a site in which strangers become 'friends' and indeed create a whole community of friendship that is very often founded on vaguely veiled erotica and the desire for subjective confirmation in community.
To this end, the exponential popularity of the social networking site is more than just the expression of human multiple mimicry, or the sense of social alienation that Sherry Turkle describes. Like the news media, Facebook is the expression of various forms of personal and social 'lack', a deficit in meaning which is perpetually borne forward by a desire for pleasure which might somehow mitigate the sense of crisis and loss in which our sense of being is perpetually embroiled.
Pillars of pain
Private Bradley Manning also shared the hacktivist dream of building a social media website, but his failed. Similarly, Rupert Murdoch, emperor of the old media, recognized the need to incorporate social media into the dominion of power. When Murdoch made this decision, the ascendant social website was MySpace, a site that fostered self-presentation to the networked world. As a free vehicle for self-promotion and a public presence, the site had been adopted by numerous celebrities, musicians and bands, who used it as a social conduit to their fans and a mechanism for selling their brand and their products. This form of self-promotion created a deft but significant commercial hierarchy within the site, dividing it between the celebrities, would-be-celebrities, and 'ordinary' users who wanted simply to make contact with their community of friends. It was really this last category who migrated to Facebook, which, initially at least, seemed more seriously to present itself within the Internet ideal of gift culture.
With his narrow, commercial vision, Murdoch entirely misread the nature of that ideal, and the precipice at which the social networkers were about to abandon MySpace as a community and friendship site. Indeed, when Murdoch bought MySpace, its cultural cachet had already peaked, and youth users were already seeing Facebook as a less nodal and commercially oriented social networking website. Thus, while Murdoch's News Corp paid $580 million for MySpace in 2005, the loss of active membership, advertising and revenue brought the value of the site down to around $100 million by 2011 (Fixmer, 2011) . The commercial failure of the MySpace venture reflects something of the capricious and rapidly changing nature of the new technologies and technological cultures, particularly around youth markets and 'taste'.
But it also says something about the limitations of the old moguls and media emperors who struggle to stay in touch with the cultures of knowing over which they imagine themselves to preside. The failure of MySpace was Murdoch's second major business embarrassment over youth markets, the other being the 2001 collapse of OneTel, a mobile phone company that Murdoch had been persuaded to support via his son, Lachlan.
Of course, this is a case of living by the sword, and the Murdoch empire certainly has been at the forefront of news and entertainment media during the latter half of the twentieth century. This mediated imagining, as we've suggested, is formed around a solidification of particular kinds of hierarchical privilege and ideological nodes that are specifically opposed to constraints on 'free speech'. In terms that recall the ethical claims of publishers like Julian Assange, Murdoch rails against the restrictions on free speech that any authority would impose. Speaking about the 'right to pay' at the American Federal Trade Commission, Murdoch contextualizes his decision to make users pay for online news in terms of the Fourth Estate principle and individual liberty:
The prospect of the US government becoming directly involved in commercial journalism ought to be chilling to anyone who cares about free speech ... [Newspapers] need to do a better job of persuading consumers that high quality reliable news and information does not come free. (Murdoch, 2009) Through these high ideals, Murdoch newspapers like The Sun and News of the World have published 'the truth' -no matter how unseemly, salacious, painful or prurient it might be (Wolff, 2008) . The public's right to knowing is immutable -even if this means the compromise of journalistic ethics and privacy laws.
Clearly, this bliss of knowing, along with the commercial value that supports it, sits behind Murdoch's News of the World (1843-2011), its profile and problems. As a high circulation Sunday paper in the UK, which had become famous for 'exposing' celebrity sexual practices and relationships, News of the World was clearly popular with England's lower-educated social groups -people who frequently revel in the libidinal mischief of royals, politicians, movie stars, models and musicians. In order to access or invent the intimate details of celebrities' private lives, the newspaper allegedly engaged in a range of intrusive, unethical and even illegal practices, including deception and phone hacking.
In 2007, for example, the News ' special royals journalist, Clive Goodman, was sentenced to four months in prison for illegally intercepting the mobile phone messages of members of the British royal family. More recently, however, the News has also been accused of hacking the phones of ordinary people, victims of crime or the bereaved families of soldiers killed in Iraq or Afghanistan. According to The Guardian newspaper, the News may have hacked as many as 7,000 British citizens' phones (Hill, 2011) . Among the targets was Milly Dowler, a missing child who was later found to have been murdered (Davies and Hill, 2011) . In this instance, the News supported the Dowler family's anti-paedophile campaign, even after they had been secretly hacking the missing girl's voicemail.
This moral aporia was part of the News ' broader crusade, undertaken during the 2000s, by which it led popular opinion against all sex offenders. This kind of hyperbolic moralizing is absurdly comic in one sense, as it merely feeds the salaciousness by which the newspaper and paparazzi maintain public interest as redirected libido (see Foucault, 1981) ; the artifice of moral posturing mobilizes desire(-lack), sales and profit.
At a more egregious level, however, this moral aporia reflects a certain kind of social violence, or violation, that Murdoch and the News quite consciously and maliciously exploit. The moral artifice of 'free speech' or 'crime control' is mobilized against any alternative knowings that may pose a commercial, ethical or political challenge to the Murdoch empire and its foundational knowledge systems. These systems are designed quite clearly to deny the fracturing of an imperial privilege that announces itself in the rigour and discipline of transparency, moral outrage and law -but which deftly denies all of these principles in a clever game of imagining and deceit. Murdoch is certainly canny enough to realize that the state, law and conditions of absolute knowing are riddled with instability and paradox; his skill is fostered around the capacity to work the channels in pursuit of self-interest and the fortification of his privilege.
Paradoxically, this is also the approach adopted by Julian Assange and the Arab Uprising dissidents, and, in a less principled, or less self-reflexive, way, by the London rioters. Thus, The Guardian (2011a) also revealed that prior to the 2010 elections Murdoch had pressured the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and other Labour Party MPs to restrain their interrogations of News of the World and the phone hacking scandals. Murdoch's capacity to marshal his media voice was clearly the source of the pressure, a strategy that had enabled the tycoon regularly to exert disproportionate influence in the English-speaking polity (Greenwald, 2005; Wolff, 2008) .
This point has been made by many commentators, especially those who fear the media's intervention in democratic processes and control of information. From this perspective, Murdoch's own posturing around free speech is more simply an exercise of claim: that is, a claim to participate in the polity, take a political and moral position, and sell information and entertainment at whatever price the market will pay. Free speech, in this sense, is not free at all, but represents another commodity in the pleasure economy and the complex systems of governance.
During 2010 and 2011 students in Rome and London expressed the same rights, protesting against increasing student fees and the cost of educational and informational access. Resulting from austerity measures linked to the Global Financial Crisis, the student protests were largely dismissed by the Italian Prime Minister at the time, Silvio Berlusconi, also a media mogul, and British Prime Minister David Cameron. Indeed, in the same week as the Italian riots and as if to corroborate the London students' pessimistic disavowal of democratic politics, the British Prime Minister removed power from the government's Business Secretary, who had 'declared war' on global media mogul Rupert Murdoch. Thus, the Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, sought to restrain any sense that his government -including the Liberal Democratic Finance Minister -was 'above the media'. The Finance Minister, Vince Cable, had the temerity, it would seem, to challenge Murdoch's bid to take full control of the pay-for-service TV broadcaster, BSkyB.
Having had his powers removed, the Finance Minister apologized for his contentiousness and his actions, while the Prime Minister set about repairing the offence that had been caused to Murdoch and his company, News Corp. Clearly, this policy of appeasement and rapprochement acknowledged Murdoch's capacity to influence public opinion, particularly as Murdoch's best-selling newspaper, The Sun , had actively supported the Conservative's electoral bid in May 2010.
Over recent years, in fact, the only really potent challenge to this alignment of newspaper moguls, like Berlusconi and Murdoch, with conservative governments has been mounted by groups like Occupy, the student protestors and the London rioters. Each in its own way, these groups have vehemently objected to the deep cuts in public spending that conservative governments have exercised, purportedly as a response to the GFC and ongoing economic problems in Europe. While Occupy and the rioting university students of London and Rome may appear more erudite, articulate and ideologically refined than the London rioters, the impact of the cuts was perhaps more acutely experienced by the rioters: their claims may have been more immediate and exigent. The university students fused their grievances with lofty attacks on the banks, the global hegemony and the philosophical roots of the conservative-liberal lineage. For the youth of Tottenham and other poorer suburbs around London, the cuts threatened their youth clubs, their parents' jobs and their community. In the midst of these more corporeal and immediate threats, Facebook and its community fantasy remain unabridged. The Arab Uprisings evolve as new fields of sectarian violence, ideological warfare and privation. The Old Moguls continue to rattle their sabres.
